Thursday 21 July 2011

SQL Injection Prevention

This article is focused on providing clear, simple, actionable guidance for preventing SQL Injection flaws in your applications. SQL Injection attacks are unfortunately very common, and this is due to two factors:
  1. the significant prevalence of SQL Injection vulnerabilities, and
  2. the attractiveness of the target (i.e., the database typically contains all the interesting/critical data for your application).
It’s somewhat shameful that there are so many successful SQL Injection attacks occurring, because it is EXTREMELY simple to avoid SQL Injection vulnerabilities in your code.

SQL Injection flaws are introduced when software developers create dynamic database queries that include user supplied input. To avoid SQL injection flaws is simple. Developers need to either: a) stop writing dynamic queries; and/or b) prevent user supplied input which contains malicious SQL from affecting the logic of the executed query.

This article provides a set of simple techniques for preventing SQL Injection vulnerabilities by avoiding these two problems. These techniques can be used with practically any kind of programming language with any type of database. There are other types of databases, like XML databases, which can have similar problems (e.g., XPath and XQuery injection) and these techniques can be used to protect them as well.
Primary Defenses:
  • Option #1: Use of Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries)
  • Option #2: Use of Stored Procedures
  • Option #3: Escaping all User Supplied Input
Additional Defenses:


Also Enforce: Least Privilege
Also Perform: White List Input Validation  


Example :

The following (Java) example is UNSAFE, and would allow an attacker to inject code into the query that would be executed by the database. The unvalidated “customerName” parameter that is simply appended to the query allows an attacker to inject any SQL code they want. Unfortunately, this method for accessing databases is all too common. 
  • String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = "
       + request.getParameter("customerName");
     
     try {
      Statement statement = connection.createStatement( … );
      ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery( query );
     }
    
     

    1: Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries)

    The use of prepared statements (aka parameterized queries) is how all developers should first be taught how to write database queries. They are simple to write, and easier to understand than dynamic queries. Parameterized queries force the developer to first define all the SQL code, and then pass in each parameter to the query later. This coding style allows the database to distinguish between code and data, regardless of what user input is supplied.

    Prepared statements ensure that an attacker is not able to change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker. In the safe example below, if an attacker were to enter the userID of tom' or '1'='1, the parameterized query would not be vulnerable and would instead look for a username which literally matched the entire string tom' or '1'='1.
    Language specific recommendations:

  • Java EE – use PreparedStatement() with bind variables
  • .NET – use parameterized queries like SqlCommand() or OleDbCommand() with bind variables
  • PHP – use PDO with strongly typed parameterized queries (using bindParam())
  • Hibernate - use createQuery() with bind variables (called named parameters in Hibernate)
  • SQLite - use sqlite3_prepare() to create a statement object
In rare circumstances, prepared statements can harm performance. When confronted with this situation, it is best to escape all user supplied input using an escaping routine specific to your database vendor as is described below, rather than using a prepared statement. Another option which might solve your performance issue is used a stored procedure instead.
Safe Java Prepared Statement Example
The following code example uses a PreparedStatement, Java's implementation of a parameterized query, to execute the same database query.

String custname = request.getParameter("customerName"); // This should REALLY be validated too
 // perform input validation to detect attacks
 String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? ";
 
 PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement( query );
 pstmt.setString( 1, custname); 
 ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( ); 
 
 

2: Stored Procedures

Stored procedures have the same effect as the use of prepared statements when implemented safely*. They require the developer to define the SQL code first, and then pass in the parameters after. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the SQL code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, and then called from the application. Both of these techniques have the same effectiveness in preventing SQL injection so your organization should choose which approach makes the most sense for you.

*Note:  'Implemented safely' means the stored procedure does not include any unsafe dynamic SQL generation. Developers do not usually generate dynamic SQL inside stored procedures. However, it can be done, but should be avoided. If it can't be avoided, the stored procedure must use input validation or proper escaping as described in this article to make sure that all user supplied input to the stored procedure can't be used to inject SQL code into the dynamically generated query. Auditors should always look for uses of sp_execute, execute or exec within SQL Server stored procedures. Similar audit guidelines are necessary for similar functions for other vendors.

There are also several cases where stored procedures can increase risk. For example, on MS SQL server, you have 3 main default roles: db_datareader, db_datawriter and db_owner. Before stored procedures came into use, DBA's would give db_datareader or db_datawriter rights to the webservice's user, depending on the requirements. However, stored procedures require execute rights, a role that is not available by default. Some setups where the user management has been centralized, but is limited to those 3 roles, cause all web apps to run under db_owner rights so stored procedures can work. Naturally, that means that if a server is breached the attacker has full rights to the database, where previously they might only have had read-access. More on this topic here. http://www.sqldbatips.com/showarticle.asp?ID=8
Safe Java Stored Procedure Example
The following code example uses a CallableStatement, Java's implementation of the stored procedure interface, to execute the same database query. The "sp_getAccountBalance" stored procedure would have to be predefined in the database and implement the same functionality as the query defined above.

String custname = request.getParameter("customerName"); // This should REALLY be validated try { CallableStatement cs = connection.prepareCall("{call sp_getAccountBalance(?)}"); cs.setString(1, custname); ResultSet results = cs.executeQuery(); // … result set handling } catch (SQLException se) { // … logging and error handling }


3: Escaping All User Supplied Input

This third technique is to escape user input before putting it in a query. If you are concerned that rewriting your dynamic queries as prepared statements or stored procedures might break your application or adversely affect performance, then this might be the best approach for you. However, this methodology is frail compared to using parameterized queries. This technique should only be used, with caution, to retrofit legacy code in a cost effective way. Applications built from scratch, or applications requiring low risk tolerance should be built or re-written using parameterized queries.

This technique works like this. Each DBMS supports one or more character escaping schemes specific to certain kinds of queries. If you then escape all user supplied input using the proper escaping scheme for the database you are using, the DBMS will not confuse that input with SQL code written by the developer, thus avoiding any possible SQL injection vulnerabilities.

To find the javadoc specifically for the database encoders, click on the ‘Codec’ class on the left hand side. There are lots of Codecs implemented. The two Database specific codecs are OracleCodec, and MySQLCodec.
Just click on their names in the ‘All Known Implementing Classes:’ at the top of the Interface Codec page.

At this time, ESAPI currently has database encoders for:
  • Oracle
  • MySQL (Both ANSI and native modes are supported)
Database encoders for:
  • SQL Server
  • PostgreSQL

 
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